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Once a leader in industrial innovation, the chemical industry has changed countless aspects of modern life. From the plastic in the toothbrush we use in the morning, to the tires we drive to work on and the fuel that powers them, to the clothes that keep us warm, chemical innovations are so infused in our daily lives that we generally take them for granted. It is difficult, therefore, to speak of the chemical industry, one that David Landes (1969, 269) has called the most "miscellaneous of industries" and which encompasses synthetic fi bers, plastics, agricultural pesticides and fertilizers, food additives, health and beauty aids, and many other products and production components. Given this variety, attempting to summarize chemical innovation is difficult. Instead, we shall focus on industrial synthetic fi bers and plastics and the inputs from which they are made. Their history offers useful lessons for how energy innovation and diffusion might be accelerated, in part because innovations in these chemical subsectors share common features with energy innovations.
Chemical innovation has been marked by the search for new inputs and the concomitant process innovations that allow the inputs to be produced and used. A prominent example of such a change is the shift from coal derived inputs for producing synthetic fi bers and plastics to those from oil and natural gas. This change, which began before World War II in the United Ashish Arora is a professor at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Alfonso Gambardella is a professor in the Department of Management at Bocconi University.
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States, was accompanied by a fl ood of innovations, including advances in petroleum refi ning and new processes for the production of important synthetic fi bers and plastics. Energy innovation, too, is likely to involve the development and large-scale deployment of new processes and new materials designed by chemists and chemical engineers.
Innovation in the chemical industry requires scaling-up laboratory discoveries into commercially viable products. This sort of scale-up is also common in the oil refi ning industry, and, indeed, chemical engineering has its roots in oil refi ning. The gigantic refi neries that produce gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and a host of valuable inputs used in a wide range of commonly used materials embody numerous innovations in chemistry and chemical engineering. The biorefi neries of the future will no doubt be different from the oil refi neries of the present, but much of the expertise they require will come from chemists and chemical engineers.
There are more subtle connections as well. The successful commercial introduction of new materials has required careful attention to questions such as how downstream users would use them, whether existing processing machinery would have to be modifi ed, and how the fi nal product in which the new material was embodied would differ. All these considerations have effects that ripple through the value chain, which is typical of energy innovations as well.
1 For example, the introduction of a new automobile fuel may also require changes in how it is distributed and used, and a new form of rubber with different temperature-related properties may require new learning about best applications for its use. Chemical innovation, which has often consisted of new types of materials that are used to produce existing products, have long featured this type of adjustment.
Despite this complexity, for the most part, the chemical industry has relied upon markets to coordinate the required changes. This coordination is far from perfect. Many chemical processes have produced harmful by-products. However, the history of chemical innovation also refl ects the search to mitigate or eliminate waste. For instance, chlorine produced as a by-product in producing caustic soda in the mid-nineteenth century was used to produce bleaching powder. Changes in the market place, especially growth in demand, have occasionally made what was hitherto waste more valuable and, therefore, worth capturing. Thus, in the nineteenth century in the United States, kerosene was the principal product produced from crude oil. Natural gas was routinely fl ared in oil pumps, and heavier components in crude oil, such as waxes, were simply tossed aside. Over time, in response to rising demand, techniques were developed to use these hitherto waste products. The implications for energy innovation, which centrally involves the problem of dealing with harmful by-products such as carbon dioxide, are obvious.
Major innovations in the recent history of the chemical industry have been the result of privately funded research carried out in the laboratories of large chemical and oil fi rms. In the 1870s, when the chemical industry revolved around synthetic dyes, fi rms believed that hiring chemists would help them discover new dyes, the way to commercial success. During the 1920s and years of the Great Depression, the spread of the automobile created demand for gasoline (and, hence, for new refi ning technologies), lacquers (as car paint), plastics, and materials for car tires. Later, World War II greatly boosted the demand for plastics, synthetic fi bers such as nylon and polyester, high octane gasoline, and synthetic rubber. In each case, the payoffs for developing new materials, improving them, and developing techniques to reduce production costs and increase production volumes were signifi cant and predictable. The post-World War II boom in the 1950s and 1960s further increased demand for synthetic fi bers such as polyester and for new plastics such as polystyrene.
This commitment to investing in research, not simply in production, became ingrained in the industry. Hounshell and Smith (1988) argue that the commercial success of nylon, commercialized just as World War II started, may have been salient in shaping the thinking of the management of DuPont, and by extension, of other chemical fi rms as well. Hounshell and Smith describe in detail the largely fruitless attempts of DuPont management to search for blockbuster products that would be as successful as nylon. In the process, the company built substantial in-house capability for research and development (R&D), and for some time even operated an inhouse "Polymer Institute." By contrast, most other technology-intensive sectors developed after World War II, by which time government support for research was more forthcoming and, in some cases, decisive in starting the industry.
Early in the history of the industry, when synthetic dyestuffs were based on advances in organic chemistry by German chemists, universities made formative contributions, and in the twentieth century, they have contributed indirectly (but importantly) by institutionalizing the learning being created by fi rms and by training students-creating the disciplines, as it were, of petroleum engineering, chemical engineering, polymer chemistry, polymer engineering, and so on. The federal government's role in supporting innovation in the industry has not, however, been limited to supporting universities and programs such as synfuels and the synthetic rubber program. It has also played a key role in facilitating the development of a "market for technology" in the industry, through both antitrust and intellectual property policy. But it has been in private research labs, and indeed through the research programs of a wide range of private fi rms including smaller players and specialized engineering fi rms, or SEFs, that most recent discoveries have taken place.
The development of new processes and materials alone does not make a signifi cant contribution to economic growth; the new processes and mate-rials have to be widely diffused. In the chemical industry, this diffusion was largely market based. Direct government subsidies were mostly unimportant. The rapid diffusion of synthetic fi bers and plastics, such as nylon, polyester, and polystyrene was fostered by an extensive market for technology in which chemical technologies were widely licensed. Specialized engineering fi rms, which supplied technology and know-how, played a key role in this process. The emergence of these markets for technology appears to have been importantly due to antitrust policies, principally in the United States, and the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
In this chapter, we begin by laying out the early history of the chemical industry for an overview of the role innovation has played in its development. We then explore three noteworthy historical experiences. We describe the switch in coal-based raw materials to those derived from oil and gas and briefl y analyze two government programs that have attempted to promote innovation: synthetic rubber and synfuels. We take a close look at the role that specialized engineering fi rms have played in the diffusion of important innovations, and we detail the effect that government policies have had on fostering innovation.
Early History
The modern chemical industry began with organic chemicals and, specifically, synthetic dyes. Beginning with William Perkin's accidental discovery of a mauve (purple) dye in 1856 while in Professor August Hofmann's lab, new synthetic dyes were rapidly and subsequently discovered in France and Germany. By the 1870s, German fi rms dominated the synthetic dye market. Although the initial discoveries were made in the labs of university professors-there were few chemical labs outside universities-private fi rms quickly began investing in their own labs: by the 1880s, the leading German fi rms had created in-house laboratories for discovering new synthetic dyes. Ten years later, the vast majority of synthetic dyes came from the R&D labs of German chemical companies.
University research remained important for opening up fi elds of inquiry and of suggesting fruitful areas of investigation. For instance, Friedrich August Kekulé's discovery of the benzene ring structure in 1866 was crucial for the discovery of dyes based on aniline by enabling researchers to predict what colors different reagents might produce. By the 1880s, university research was aimed at clarifying the structure of dyes discovered in corporate labs, and understanding their properties, rather than discovering new dyes as such (Murmann 2003) .
The United States was a follower in scientifi c chemical research and also a net technology importer until World War I. During this time, American chemical fi rms focused on developing new ways of producing chemicals on a large scale, especially commodity chemicals like sulfuric acid (Arora and Rosenberg 1998) . These innovations were based in experience, rather than scientifi c discovery-that is, the innovations arose from trial and error in the lab, rather than relying on recent scientifi c advances. Products such as fertilizers and gasoline also required large-scale production to reduce costs. As petroleum refi ning grew in importance, so did the demand for new refi ning processes.
The period from 1920 to 1960 probably marks the golden age of innovation in the chemical industry, at least as far as the United States is concerned. The major polymers-plastics and synthetic fi bers-originated in corporate labs and were commercialized during this forty-year period (table 3.1).
2 This period also marks major developments in chemical engineering, with the commercialization of a number of important chemical processes. In many cases, fundamental scientifi c contributions came from researchers working for private fi rms, such as Wallace Carothers (DuPont), Frank Mayo (U.S. Rubber), and Giulio Natta (Montecatini). Paul Flory, later to receive the Nobel Prize in chemistry for his contributions to the area of polymer chemistry, worked for many years in the research departments of DuPont, Standard Oil, and other chemical fi rms before moving to academia. Chemical engineering was a distinctly American achievement-more specifi cally, it was a testimony to America's very productive university-industry interface.
3 The signal contribution of universities was to train students and institutionalize the disciplines of chemical engineering, petroleum engineering, polymer chemistry, and polymer engineering (Rosenberg 1998) . Many of the basic technological breakthroughs came from researchers trained in these new disciplines and moving on to corporate labs. For example, the fi rst signifi cant chemical process innovation, the Haber-Bosch process, was developed by BASF early in the twentieth century. The generalpurpose nature of chemical engineering enabled university research and training to play an important role in applying engineering science to the practical problem of designing large-scale processes. A number of the major advances in catalytic refi ning techniques were developed by oil fi rms, notably Standard Oil of New Jersey (now ExxonMobil). University researchers were sometimes involved in these innovations, but typically in partnership with researchers from corporate labs. Notably, Warren Lewis and Edwin Gilliland from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) developed fl uidized-bed catalytic cracking in close cooperation with the chemical engineers at Standard Oil (Spitz 1988) .
Individuals and small engineering fi rms (which were typically entrepreneurial start-up fi rms) were another important source of chemical process innovation during the golden age. For instance, Scientifi c Design, a small fi rm founded in 1946, developed new fi xed-bed catalytic processes for ethylene glycol, maleic anhydride, and, most important, for production of purifi ed terephthalic acid, the basic building block of polyester. Similarly, National Hydrocarbon Company (now Universal Oil Products [UOP]), provided some of the fundamental advances in refi ning technology, including thermal catalytic cracking, reforming, and sulfur extraction. Universal Oil Products remains a leading source of refi ning technology to this day.
Case Studies in Chemical Innovation
New materials used by fi rms as inputs (rather than sold directly to consumers) typically take a long time to diffuse broadly. Not only are industrial fi rms inherently conservative in their adoption of new materials, diffusion also takes time because new materials often require complementary changes 3. See Landau and Rosenberg (1992) for a discussion of the role of MIT in the development of chemical engineering as a discipline. The large size of the market had introduced American fi rms to the problems involved in scaling-up production of basic products, such as chlorine, caustic soda, soda ash, and sulfuric acid as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. This focus on large-scale production had additional benefi ts when it turned out that the new petrochemical technologies had strong plant-level economies of scale. Because scaling-up output was not a simple matter-it involved considerable learning-early experience with process technologies gained American fi rms a head start when petrochemicals became the dominant feedstock after World War II.
in the physical infrastructure. This issue is likely to arise in the case of energy. Fuel cells for automobiles are a case in point. The concomitant changes needed in the physical infrastructure (such as fueling stations) are thought to involve large fi nancial investments and coordination problems, greatly delaying the widespread adoption of fuel cells (see, for instance, Struben and Sterman 2008) .
Another signifi cant cause of delay is what Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) dub "co-invention" by users-that is, the need for users of the new technology to become familiar with its use and in some cases to design complementary adaptations to facilitate its use. Bresnahan and Greenstein found that co-invention can pose signifi cant costs in time and money to a company, as demonstrated by the resistance and delay in the switch from mainframes to client-servers in U.S. fi rms. David (1990) similarly argues that the diffusion of electrical power was slowed as manufacturers, used to steam power, had to learn how to exploit the full potential of this new energy source. In the case of the chemical industry, Hounshell (1988) shows that as new industrial materials were introduced, users had to learn about the properties of these new materials. For instance, when fi rst introduced, rayon fi ber was believed to be weaker than cotton fi ber, and because rayon fi bers were further weakened when wet, the material was assumed to be unsuitable for tire cord. However, it was discovered that hot rayon is 50 percent stronger than cotton. Rayon tire cord, however, did not take off until World War II, when circumstances forced the use of synthetic rubber for tires; synthetic rubber tires run hotter than natural rubber tires, and, therefore, rayon was a better cord material under those hotter conditions. This also illustrates the systemic interdependencies in chemical innovation.
However, in general, diffusion in the chemical industry has been surprisingly fast. The most notable is the swift and thorough switch from coal to petroleum as the dominant chemical feedstock after World War II.
Coal to Petroleum
At the end of World War I, coal was central to the chemical industry, not so much as an energy source but as a source of raw materials: coalderived chemicals formed the basis of the chemical industry. For instance, coal tar provided a source for synthetic dyes, coal coking furnaces provided the nitrogen for fertilizers and explosives such as TNT, and coal provided the toluene for those explosives. Heating coal to make coke-a raw material in the manufacture of high-carbon steel-also produces a number of chemically useful gases and byproducts: coal tar, ammonia, and benzene. Indeed, fi rms such as Solvay, Koppers, and Allied Chemicals owned batteries of by-product coke ovens to produce these valuable chemicals. These joined a large complementary physical infrastructure of by-product coke ovens across the United States and around Europe, complementing a substantial accumulated learning about the use of coal by-products as chemical building blocks. As late as 1938, DuPont, the leading American chemical company, announced that it would create a synthetic fi ber "from coal, air, and water" when starting its fi rst commercial nylon plant in Seaford, Delaware.
Everything changed with the meteoric postwar popularity of the automobile, which greatly increased the demand for gasoline, leading refi ners to improve oil-refi ning processes. Furthermore, the oil-refi ning process for automobile fuel used only a portion of the petroleum refi ned, leaving ample by-product with no clear use. During the 1940s, petroleum by-products from automobile oil refi neries increasingly went into the production of basic materials, such as plastics, synthetic rubber, and synthetic fi bers. Oil-based chemicals began to quickly outstrip the previously dominant coal-based chemicals.
The change had many dimensions. New extracting and refi ning technology for petroleum had to be developed. Further, there was a concomitant change in the technology from acetylene-based chemistry (triple bonds typical of coal by-products) to the ethylene-based chemistry (double bonds) of oil by-products. But, ultimately, the move from coal to oil was driven by the superiority of oil-based feedstocks and by falling costs of oil due to the progressive improvements in extraction and refi ning technologies.
The switch from coal to oil also is remarkable because of its rapid worldwide diffusion. That these processes were rapidly adopted in Europe is significant because Europe was abundantly supplied with coal (but little oil) and because Europe had pioneered the use of coal in synthetic dyes and plastics.
The switch to oil began in the United States, which had abundant domestic oil and natural gas reserves.
4 By 1950, half of the total U.S. production of organic chemicals was based on natural gas and oil; by 1960, the proportion was 88 percent. The switch came later, but as rapidly, in Western Europe. In the United Kingdom in 1949, for instance, 9 percent of total organic chemical production was based on oil and natural gas, and the proportion rose to 63 percent by 1962. In Germany, the fi rst petrochemical plant was set up in the mid-1950s, and by 1973, German companies derived 90 percent of their chemical feedstocks from oil. In light of Germany's substantial endowment of coal and the fact that German fi rms had made large, irretrievable investments in coal-related technologies, the changeover of the German industry is especially remarkable (Stokes 1988) . The swift diffusion of petrochemical technology in Europe ironically was aided by the World War II destruction of the German and French industrial capacity, which reduced switching costs. However, the ready availability of petrochemical technology from American fi rms, especially by specialized suppliers of technology and engineering services, was crucial. Equally important, if not more so, was the postwar availability of crude oil from the Middle East, with the supplies guaranteed by Pax Americana. 5 In other words, markets in both goods and technology played a fundamental role in facilitating the switch from coal to petroleum in the United States and Western Europe.
The enormity of this shift may not be easily appreciated today, until we begin to consider an analogous energy innovation challenge, such as a possible increase in the use of biomass. At that point, a range of issues analogous to the coal-to-oil switch arise. For instances, can processes be developed that can handle variations in the composition of biomass sources? Can processes be developed to remove impurities from biomass that might interfere with their processing (such as poisoning the catalyst)? Can the likely undesirable by-products be removed after processing in a cost-effective and scalable manner? Can existing equipment be used? Similar questions were confronted and solved through innovation and diffusion during the coalto-oil shift.
This shift is also remarkable because direct government intervention was not central to the shift. For the most part, advances in oil refi ning, advances in how new types of chemical raw material could be extracted from crude oil and natural gas, and the diffusion of these advances did not rely upon government subsidies or other types of government incentives. Instead, these were in responses to changes in the availability of different types of resources and fundamental advances in the underlying scientifi c and engineering knowledge about materials and large-scale chemical reactions. Further, as we discuss at greater length later, the diffusion of these new technologies was largely mediated by the market for technology, in which specialized engineering fi rms played an important role.
This episode also illustrates the power of demand in calling forth the development of new technologies. As oil became more widely available, and as advances in oil-refi ning increased the potential for extracting more useful raw materials from crude oil and natural gas, there were incentives to explore oil as the source of the basic building blocks for chemical products. These incentives were especially marked in countries that were relatively abundant in oil. Western Europe was abundant in coal, but oil was relatively scarce. America was generously endowed with both coal and oil but, relative to Europe, was relatively abundant in oil and, moreover, had less invested in producing chemicals from inputs derived from coal. Not surprisingly, America led the shift from coal to oil.
5. The discovery of oil in the Middle East was signifi cant not only because it meant that more oil was available, but also because the additional reserves would be supplied through a global market, and, therefore, control over oil was unlikely to be used as an economic or military weapon. The U.S. guarantee of unhindered oil supply to Western Europe was also very important in this respect. We are grateful to David Mowery for bringing this to our attention.
The Synthetic Rubber Research Program
The Synthetic Rubber Research Program offers an interesting instance of a government-funded cooperative research program in the chemical industry. 6 This wartime program took place from 1939 to 1945, when the United States faced being cut off from nearly 90 percent of the world's natural rubber supplies located in Southeast Asia. As a response, the U.S. government formed a consortium of the leading rubber fi rms, some of the leading chemical fi rms, and selected university researchers to expand and improve the production of synthetic rubber. The program was later extended to 1956 . Between 1942 and 1956 , the U.S. government invested $56 million for R&D in this consortium. The program mandated free exchange of information among participants. 7 The principal objectives of the program were threefold. The fi rst was to expand greatly the scale of synthetic rubber production. The second was to improve the quality of the synthetic rubber and produce specialty rubbers, such as rubbers suitable for use at low temperatures. The third objective, less explicit and of lower priority, was to develop greater knowledge and understanding of polymers.
The fi rst objective of the program was successfully met. By 1945, the United States produced nearly 850,000 tons of synthetic rubber (up from less than 10,000 tons in 1941), more than seven times the peak German production achieved in 1943. Virtually all of the ramped-up production went to the war effort; the U.S. government purchased all production from the program, and companies producing synthetic rubber did not have to worry about being able to sell it. Having a guaranteed market in the U.S. government was important because it released the companies from concerns that there would be insufficient demand for their efforts.
The tremendous increase in the production of synthetic rubber did not require radical technological advance. Although a variety of alternative monomers (building blocks) were tried out, it turned out that butadiene and styrene, used in the Buna-S rubber patented in Germany in 1921, were the most suitable.
8 Neither was the basic process fundamentally new. Even so, a variety of logistical and technological problems had to be solved, such as expanding the supply of butadiene, for which advances in chemical engineering and petroleum refi ning were critical. Butadiene could be produced from the by-products of oil refi ning or natural gas. It could also be produced from other sources, such as industrial alcohol (ethanol). Many different sources of ethanol were considered, including alcohol from grain or molasses. In Europe, Chemische Werke Huls (a German specialty chemicals company) nearly built a tire plant with French red wine as an ethylene source; the United States actually imported beet ethanol for butadiene for the synthetic rubber program shortly after World War II. During the tenure of the Synthetic Rubber Program, Congress passed laws mandating use of grain ethanol for butadiene production. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose! The vast bulk of butadiene, however, was ultimately produced from oil-refi ning by-products.
Styrene, the other key input, could also be obtained from coal by-products, but oil-based sources were more promising, particularly after new processes were developed that could produce benzene ring type molecules. Government coordination played an important role in styrene production as well. The Dow Chemical Company was asked to take charge of styrene production for the program and build large styrene plants in Torrance (California), Velasco (Texas), and Sarnia (Ontario) using Dow technology and to supervise construction of several other plants. Union Carbide Corporation was asked to build a large plant based on its technology, and Monsanto Company was asked to build an ethylbenzene-styrene plant using Dow and Monsanto technology, in partnership with Lummus Corporation. The Koppers Company was asked to build a plant using vapor phase alkylation process using technical contributions from UOP, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Koppers. U.S. production rose from less than 2 million pounds per month in 1941 to 20 million pounds per month by the end of 1943. By the end of 1944, production was 40 million pounds per month (Spitz 1988) .
The program's second objective of improving the quality of synthetic rubber was complementary to the fi rst objective. Once again, though not fundamental in terms of the science involved, a number of improvements to the polymerization process were critical in producing synthetic rubber of a higher and more consistent quality. These changes were especially important for "cold rubber," a new type of synthetic rubber also made from butadiene and styrene but of higher quality in some ways. Among other uses, cold rubber was better suited for automobile tires. By 1954, two thirds of all synthetic rubber produced in the United States was "cold." Especially noteworthy improvements involved better control over gel formation, improved modifi ers and emulsifi ers, and, in the case of cold rubber, a new catalyst as well.
After World War II, the Synthetic Rubber Program was no longer the only or even the principal source of innovation in synthetic rubber. For example, oil-extended rubber-cold rubber with added mineral oils, which was both cheaper and easier to process than cold rubber-was developed by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and, independently, by General Tire, which was not part of the research program.
9 New modifi ers and carbon black (an 9. There were benefi ts, nonetheless, from Goodyear's discovery, because Goodyear, as a member of the cooperative research program, made its discovery available to all other members. important rubber additive) came from Phillips Petroleum, not a member of the program until after those discoveries. Similarly, the next generation of synthetic rubbers (the so-called nitrile rubber) were privately developed by two fi rms, Goodrich and Goodyear, outside the synthetic rubber program.
Although the government's research program succeeded in its two main objectives, the program had signifi cant design fl aws that ultimately narrowed its effectiveness in encouraging more widespread innovation. Perhaps its greatest fl aw was its infl exible insistence on a common "recipe" to be followed by all participating companies; this may have delayed the adoption of a number of improvements (Morris 1989) . The justifi cation for the commonrecipe requirement was that it would facilitate cooperation among members and simplify processing. However, according to Morris (1989) , the effect was to complicate testing and large-scale introduction of new recipes. The common-recipe requirement also pushed many consortium members to spin off or partition some of their internal research projects, thus protecting themselves from the restrictions of the government program.
The information-sharing mandate was both a benefi t and a curse for the program. On the one hand, the mandate allowed a number of fi rms to enter the industry, particularly after the end of World War II. This greatly increased competition and contributed to the rapid growth of the industry. On the other hand, the mandate diluted the incentives of fi rms to develop innovations because they would have to share the information with their rivals, lowering their private returns. Consequently, some participating fi rms had research groups working in rubber and polymer technologies that were carefully kept apart from the research groups participating in the Synthetic Rubber Program. Many of the major advances in technology came from outside the research sponsored by the program during that time period.
The greatest failure of the government research program in promoting fundamental technical advance (as opposed to increasing the production of synthetic rubber for the war effort), in Morris's opinion, was in the case of synthetic natural rubber (i.e., a synthetic route to the production of natural rubber, as opposed to a synthetic material with properties like those of natural rubber). Although GR-S (Government Rubber Styrene, formerly Buna-S) rubber worked well for automobile tire track, natural rubber was much better for truck and airplane tires, where loads and temperatures are markedly higher. Many program participants, from both industry and academia, tried to develop a suitable synthetic rubber for trucks and planes. The solution turned out to be a process of synthesizing natural rubber itself by polymerizing isoprene. The pioneering research of the German chemist Karl Ziegler in 1950 (not the U.S. government research program), in the catalytic polymerization of polyethylene and related materials, was instrumental in synthesizing natural rubber. Morris (1989) suggests that the information sharing requirements imposed by the government program may have delayed the application of Ziegler's discoveries until 1955.
Thus, neither the basic process for producing synthetic rubber, namely, the butadiene-styrene process, nor some of the important postwar improvements in the process for synthetic rubber can be credited to the governmentfunded program. The government research program succeeded in its immediate wartime aims, but not in its longer-term peace time ones. However, the government funds at stake were small. Between 1943 and 1955, only $55 million were invested in R&D, a fraction of the nearly $700 million capital investment in synthetic rubber production in 1945 alone and less than 2 percent of the total value of the synthetic rubber produced over this period.
The government's synthetic rubber research program succeeded in increasing production because it quickly settled on a viable technology, standardized the inputs (for the most part), and coordinated the production. As well, it coordinated with the users of synthetic rubber and provided capital to construct the various production facilities. The program worked best where the technology required incremental improvements advancements, which, nonetheless, cumulatively had a large impact. The program was able to coordinate private parties on a given standard (e.g., the GR-S rubber standard), which was desirable because the standard itself was a good one. Getting to a good standard was more likely because the technology was relatively mature and progress required was incremental.
Conversely, the Synthetic Rubber Program did not facilitate development of radical breakthroughs or fundamental discoveries in polymer science (although it contributed to both). This undoubtedly had much to do with the priorities of the program, which imposed certain infl exibilities that hindered radical innovation. In some cases, the information-sharing mandate diluted the incentives of fi rms to develop innovations because they would have to share the information with their rivals. Further, the strong applied orientation of the program implied a reduced priority for the training of graduate students, resulting in a much smaller contribution to the growth of polymer science than might otherwise have been.
The program's history also highlights the diversity of the potential sources of innovation. In the rubber research program, important innovations came from unexpected sources outside the program. General Tire invented "cold rubber," and Philips Petroleum, a smaller oil company from Oklahoma, albeit one with a strong tradition of chemical research, made signifi cant contributions to the development of carbon black and other modifi ers. Therefore, an innovation environment that has left ample room for new players has also made greater room for success, rather than one placing large early bets on a handful of players.
A third lesson from the history of the Synthetic Rubber Program is that of the role of demand, or procurement. During the war, all production from the program was purchased by the government at guaranteed prices, and companies were, therefore, not concerned about being able to sell their product. After the war, the renewed availability of natural rubber raised doubts about the viability of synthetic rubber, but the greater versatility of different types of synthetic rubber eventually prevailed.
The Synfuel Program
As early as the 1920s, the U.S. government had experimented with liquefaction of coal and other substances for fuels, but it did not result in a signifi cant program until the end of World War II. 10 The 1944 Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act led to a $30 million fi ve-year Department of the Interior research program that attempted to alleviate shortfalls in the supply of oil during after immediately after the war. The basic technologies, coal liquefaction and coal gasifi cation, already existed, but neither was commercially viable at prevailing prices. The objective of the program was to promote new processes, catalysts, and input sources that would lead to commercial viability. Through the program, a demonstration coal hydrogenation plant was constructed in 1949 that produced synthetic diesel and inspired great optimism for the prospect of synthetic fuel to replace fuel from crude oil, supplies of which at the time were limited and expensive. With a view of avoiding an "energy crisis" and dependence on "foreign oil" (a newly coined phrase at that point), Congress extended the program twice for an additional eleven years and increased funding to $87.6 million. However, the next plants built could not produce fuel at such low costs and high volume that had earlier excited so much optimism in the industry.
In the 1950s, a combination of lowered expectations for the synthetic fuels industry, the opening of Middle Eastern oil fi elds, new private forays into coal hydrogenation, and a political shift in both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, led to Congress ending funding for synthetic fuel programs in 1953. Low-level research continued in "backburner" mode by the interior department, and later this research was transferred to the newly created Department of Energy in the 1970s.
The increases in crude oil prices in the 1970s revived the synthetic fuel efforts, with a mixture of motives consisting of reducing dependence on imported oil and promoting the use of coal, especially coal mined in the eastern part of the United States. The Energy Security Act of 1980 established the Synthetic Fuel Corporation (SFC), which was set up to promote the commercialization of these technologies. The corporation was a quasigovernmental entity comprising private industry partners and initially authorized for a maximum of twelve years and a maximum of $88 billion. The interest in synfuels heated up throughout the 1970s, and by the end of that decade, synfuels research was a major component of the nation's energy program. Spurred by instability in the Middle East, the high price of crude oil and fears that oil supplies were drying up, projected dramatic increases in future oil costs, and concern that "market failures" were inhibiting private companies to invest in research, the synfuels program again regained popularity.
Under the program, some technical progress was made and large-scale processes were developed. Coal gasifi cation appears to have been the most successful of the technological investments. One facility, the Cool Water Coal Gasifi cation plant, which was provided price guarantees worth $115 million, succeeding in coming under budget and meeting the expected production and quality standards. However, Cool Water was a rare success for the SFC. Ultimately, low crude oil prices reduced the economic and strategic imperative to develop synthetic fuels from coal or other sources. The SFC was unable to lay the foundations for a commercially viable industry, in part because the technology failed to support reliable and large-scale production of affordable synthetic fuels. The broad consensus is that the government's synfuel programs failed, though there is less agreement on the causes of the failure.
At the risk of oversimplifying the contrast, the Synthetic Rubber Program succeeded because there was an enormous growth in demand for synthetic rubber, whereas the synthetic fuel program largely operated in an era of abundant, though occasionally expensive, oil and gas. Although price signals and signals about the future growth in demand are not the only ones that matter, they surely were very important for the failure of the synfuels program.
Diffusion and the Critical Role of Specialized Engineering Firms
In 1999, the world's then largest greenfi eld refi nery and associated chemical plants, embodying the latest technology available with an estimated cost of around $6 billion, was commissioned in Jamnagar, India. The event passed by with little comment. In marked contrast, when an Indian company announced the development of a new car nearly a decade later, there was extensive publicity. And yet refi ning technology was developed only in the 1920s, whereas the internal combustion engine is nearly a century and a half old. One can infer that chemical technology has diffused so broadly that it is considered unremarkable for the latest technology to be used in a poor country. Put differently, there is no need for an Indian fi rm to try to design its own refi neries and chemical plants because the required technology can be readily acquired at a reasonable price. The rapid diffusion of innovative techniques and processes is one of the striking features of the chemical industry. This is particularly true of chemical innovations since World War II, the diffusion of which were fostered by SEFs. 11 11. This rapid diffusion greatly accelerated the maturation of the chemical industry and the consequent wide-ranging restructuring that the industry underwent in the United States in the 1980s, followed shortly by a similar restructuring in Europe (Arora and Gambardella 1998) .
In a pioneering study, Freeman (1968, 30) noted that for the period 1960 to 1966, "nearly three quarters of the major new plants were 'engineered,' procured, and constructed by specialist plant contractors." Moreover, Freeman found that SEFs were an important source of process technologies; during 1960 to 1966, they accounted as a group for about 30 percent of all licenses of chemical processes. Freeman's fi ndings are confi rmed by more recent data analyzed in Arora and Gambardella (1998) . These data show that for the period 1980 to 1990, almost three-fourths of all chemical plants in the world were engineered by SEFs. Although the share of SEFs varies across different types of chemical products, in practically all of them it is above 50 percent. Moreover, SEFs still account for about 35 percent of all licenses. However, SEFs in the 1980s were perhaps more important than this fi gure suggests because their very presence induced many downstream companies to license their processes. In essence, SEFs helped create a market for technology, making process technology into a commodity that could be bought and sold.
The fi rst SEFs were formed in the early part of the twentieth century, and their clients were typically oil companies. However, SEFs also started operating in bulk chemicals such as sulfuric acid and ammonia. Later, most SEFs would design large-scale plants for refi neries and petrochemical building blocks, such as ethylene. Companies such as Kellogg Engineering, Badger Engineering, Stone and Webster, and UOP are prominent examples of early SEFs.
In addition to diffusion, the SEFs also played a crucial role in the development of new and improved processes. However, with a few notable exceptions, SEFs did not develop radically new processes. The contributions of SEFs have been largely in two areas: catalytic processes and engineering design improvements.
12 For the most part, however, major process innovations came from the large oil and chemical companies (Mansfi eld et al. 1977) . The SEFs were most effective at moving new processes down the learning curve. By acting as independent licensers, SEFs also induced chemical fi rms to license their technology (Arora and Gambardella 1998) . The SEFs provide a vivid illustration of the economies of scale operating at the industry level, rather than at the plant or individual fi rm. By specializing in process design and engineering and by working for a number of clients, SEFs could learn and accumulate skills and expertise that no single chemical company could match.
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Adam Smith noted more than 200 years ago that specialization and divi-12. A number of other SEFs have contributed to advances in engineering design. For instance, Kellogg made signifi cant contributions to developing high-pressure processes for ammonia in the 1930s, while Badger is associated with fl uidized-bed catalytic processes (in collaboration with Sohio). Similarly, the Danish SEF, Halder Topsoe, is the leading source of technology for ammonia plants. Lurgi, a German fi rm, licenses a number of technologies, including coal gasifi cation.
13. As independent developers of technology, SEFs are similar in some respects to today's biotech companies, allying with a number of chemical fi rms in developing new technologies. sion of labor are more extensive in larger markets. As Bresnahan and Gambardella (1998) demonstrate, a large market is important for technology specialists, but this growth in market must be in the form of an increase in the breadth (more buyers) rather than merely depth (each buyer becomes larger). Indeed, SEFs account for a greater share of licenses to small fi rms and fi rms in developing countries, indicating the mutual dependence between specialist technology suppliers and fi rms that are not technically sophisticated (fi gure 3.2).
The challenge of innovation is more than the mere discovery and development of new technologies and feedstocks. The technology and processes for using these alternatives will have an impact on the environment only if they are broadly diffused and used. Technology diffusion has been faster when fi rms like SEFs have played a role in offering technology, sometimes bundled with engineering services. Rapid diffusion of innovation in the chemical industry has resulted when major innovations were not concentrated in the hands of a few fi rms, no matter how innovative. Instead, multiple sources of innovations appear to have been desirable.
Innovation Policies in the Chemical Industry
Two policy areas stand out with respect to their effect on innovation in the chemical sector. First, intellectual property rights protection, particularly patents, has stimulated innovation and the diffusion of innovations. Second, licensing and antitrust regulations have fostered wider competition and sped up diffusion of technologies.
Intellectual Property Rights
The chemical industry has seen extensive technology diffusion though it also enjoys strong patent protection. Although this may sound like a contradiction in terms, it is not. In chemicals, although patents are effective in deterring straight imitation, rivals were often able to develop competing variants of patented chemical processes. These processes differed in terms of operating conditions, starting materials, or in terms of yields, conversion rates, and properties of the fi nal material. The ability to develop different processes resulted in a vigorous competition in the market for technology and a rapid diffusion of new technologies.
Despite the importance of technology specialists, the chemical industry has largely been spared the problems that some nonmanufacturing patent holders have created in several information technology sectors. Patents largely work well in the chemical industry in that they encourage the invention of new technologies and follow-on investment in commercializing those technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . They also encourage the widespread use of new technologies. Chemical patents work better because they are less "fuzzy." They are less fuzzy because the object of discovery can be described clearly in terms of formulas, reaction pathways, operating conditions, and the like (Levin et al. 1987 ). But it is not merely that the object of discovery is more discrete in the sense of being a particular compound. Rather, it is the ability to relate the "essential" structure of the compound to its function. This allows a patent to include within its ambit inessential variations in structure, as in minor modifi cations in side chains of a pesticide.
14 In fact, chemical product patents frequently use Markush structures, which permit a succinct and compact description of the claims and allow the inventor to protect the invention for sets of related compounds without the expense (and tedium) of testing and listing the entire set. 15 The ability to explicate the underlying scientifi c basis of the innovation allows the scope of the patent to be delimited more clearly. The obvious extensions can be foreseen more easily and described more compactly.
Conversely, when innovations cannot be described in terms of universal and general categories, sensible patent law can only provide narrow patent protection. Failure to do so results in costly patent disputes, sometimes with devastating consequences for the economy, as an early epoch in the history of the chemical industry itself shows. During the 1860s, for example, when synthetic dyes fi rst appeared, their structure was poorly understood. Broad patents led to litigation and, in some cases, unwarranted and harmful monopolies. In France, an excessively broad patent on Fuchsine (aniline red) was construed to include all processes for making the red aniline-based dye, even though the structure of aniline dyes was as yet unknown. There were also long and bitter disputes in England about the validity of the Medlock patent for magenta (another aniline dye); the dispute turned on the appropriate defi nition of "dry" arsenic acid (i.e., with or without water of crystallization). In the case of aniline blue, the dispute rested on whether the substitution of an organic acid for an inorganic acid in the production process was enough to avoid infringement (Travis 1993) . The British courts interpreted patents narrowly, with the result that competition in the British organic dyestuffs industry remained vigorous until the industry itself was overwhelmed by its German rivals. By contrast, the Fuchsine monopoly in France devastated the local industry. It should be recalled that France at fi rst rivaled Germany in organic chemistry, but the French synthetic dye industry greatly suffered from the Fuchsine dispute.
Until World War II, chemical producers did use patents to restrict entry and carve up markets. However, after the war, patents were used more frequently to facilitate technology licensing, particularly outside home mar-14. In some instances, seemingly minor variations in side chains can have signifi cant biological effects. Therefore, what is a "minor" variation is itself determined by the state of the current understanding of the relation between structure and function.
15. A Markush structure is best understood as a language for specifying chemical structures of compounds, which allows generic representation for an entire set of related compounds. See Maynard and Peters (1991) for details.
kets. In a marked departure from their pre-World War II strategy of closely controlling their technology, a number of chemical and oil companies began to use licensing as an important (although not the only) means of profi ting from innovation. Spitz (1988, 318) describes the licensing of the HerculesDistillers phenol/ acetone process "to any and all comers"; the process "was commercialized in 1953 and forever changed the way that phenol would be produced." This remarkable change in behavior appears to have been triggered in part by a newly vigorous antitrust policy in the United States, an issue that we discuss in some depth in the following.
One reason why patent protection promoted diffusion of technology was the greater competition after World War II in both product markets and especially in the market for technology. When multiple sources of technology exist, then even when the technology sources are not exact substitutes, they can provide effective competition. Arora and Fosfuri (2003) formally show that the presence of other technology holders, especially those that do not participate in the product market, encourages licensing, facilitating entry downstream.
It is also noteworthy that SEF licensing activities appear not to have been hindered by patenting. Indeed, in processes in which high rates of patenting occur, SEFs are more active than in processes with low rates of patenting (fi gure 3.1). Insofar as patenting rates are indicators of technological activity, this suggests that SEFs are active in diffusing technologies not simply in mature sectors, but also in sectors with high rates of technical advance.
An active technology market has also encouraged new entrants into the product market. Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001) show that markets for technology encourage investment by chemical fi rms in developing countries, implying that technology suppliers lower entry barriers. Lieberman (1989) fi nds that licensing was less common in concentrated chemical products, and the limited licensing that did take place was by outsiders (nonproducers and foreign fi rms). Moreover, he fi nds that when licensing was restricted, there was less entry. In a related study of twenty-four chemical product markets, Lieberman (1987) reports that patenting by outsiders was associated with a faster decline of product price, once again suggesting that outside patenting encouraged entry in the product market. This is borne out by Arora and Fosfuri (2000) , who show that the principle source of demand for technology licensed by SEFs are small fi rms in Western markets (North America, Japan, Western Europe) and fi rms in developing countries (fi gure 3.2).
Licensing and Antitrust Regulations
As we noted in the preceding, post-World War II, chemical fi rms have tended to license their technology, which has greatly contributed to technology diffusion. Ralph Landau observed in 1966 that the "the partial breakdown of secrecy barriers in the chemical industry is increasing . . . the trend toward more licensing of processes" (Landau 1966, 4) . Chemical fi rms have licensed heavily because they have faced competition in both the product and the technology markets. These two types of competition are interrelated. A competitive product market will encourage the entry of technology specialists (Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998) . When Standard Oil, with its dominant position in the oil market, tried to restrict access to refi ning technology, the independent oil fi rms turned to specialized technology suppliers such as UOP. More generally, at crucial stages in the industry's history, antitrust rulings have directly increased competition in the product market and also reduced concentration of technology ownership, increasing competition in the market for technology.
The two fi rms prominently featured in the context of antitrust enforcement in the United States were Standard Oil and DuPont. William Burton, a scientist at Standard Oil developed the fi rst commercially successful cracking process, a fi rst major innovation in refi ning technology, in 1909 to 1910. However, Standard Oil was reluctant to invest in the process. As a result of an antitrust suit, the original Standard Oil was broken up into several fi rms in 1911, among which was Standard Oil of Indiana, where Burton worked, and which not only commercialized the process but also licensed it to a number of other oil refi ners. The high royalty charged by Standard of Indiana led others to develop alternative processes, among which was UOP, which eventually developed into a leading supplier of technology to the petroleum refi ning industry.
The case of DuPont provides another important example of the role of antitrust policy. Founded as a maker of explosives powder, DuPont was split into three separate fi rms following a successful antitrust suit in 1913. The antitrust suit convinced the management of DuPont that the only path to future growth lay in entering new markets through innovation rather than acquisition of existing producers. In 1926, DuPont signed a comprehensive technology sharing agreement with Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), which also involved market-sharing. 16 The agreement entitled DuPont to exclusive access in the United States to ICI technology, such as polyethylene. However, the fear of antitrust action pushed ICI to license polyethylene to other fi rms as well after World War II. Similarly, DuPont was nudged into licensing its nylon technology (and know-how) to a Monsanto joint venture, Chemstrand, in 1951. More recently, antitrust authorities in the United States and Europe intervened when Dow Chemical acquired Union Carbide. Arora and Fosfuri (2000) . Notes: TW ϭ third world. Includes all countries except those in Western Europe, Japan, North America, Australia, and Eastern Europe (except Soviet Bloc). FW ϭ fi rst world. Comprises Western Europe, Japan, North America, and Australia. Large FW ϭ fi rst-world fi rms with turnover greater than $1 billion in 1988. Small FW ϭ all other fi rst-world fi rms.
16. The agreement would be dissolved in 1952.
The antitrust ruling attempted to try to maintain competition both in the polyethylene market as well as in the market for polyethylene technology.
17
The more general point is that licensing fl ourished when fi rms faced competition from other technologically capable fi rms (whether at home or abroad) and licensing itself facilitated entry into the industry. The second tentative conclusion from the history of the chemical industry is that antitrust enforcement, including the occasional episodes of compulsory licensing, does not appear to have had a chilling effect on innovation. Part of the reason that innovation fl ourished is that in the United States, the industry has had multiple sources of innovation. No single fi rm, not even DuPont, has dominated the chemical industry, in the way I.G. Farben and ICI dominated their respective national industries between the two world wars.
Conclusions and Caveats
Three noteworthy aspects of innovation characterize the chemical industry.
18 First, chemical innovations are deeply rooted in science. However, despite a worldwide tradition of government support for scientifi c research, chemical R&D has been largely privately funded. In the United States, federal government support for chemical research, already at a relatively low level, has steadily declined over time. Second, other than early in the history of the industry when new dyes relied upon the scientifi c advances in organic chemistry led by German chemists, innovations have largely come from fi rms rather than universities. Universities, on the other hand, have played an important role in institutionalizing the learning, creating new disciplines (which have been crucial for sustaining innovations), and developing human capital. Third, the major phases of chemical innovation have been accompanied by large growth in demand.
These three aspects are closely related. The chemical industry rose to prominence when government support for research was uncommon, chemical innovations could capture large markets by substituting for a variety of materials used as industrial inputs, and the scientifi c understanding linking the structure of their materials to their properties could increase the productivity of attempts to discover new and useful materials. Thus, it made commercial sense for fi rms to invest not simply in applied research, but also in basic research-an area typically the domain of universities and government programs. Therefore, chemical innovation has relied more heavily than some other innovation-based industries upon private investments in research, development, and commercialization. Correspondingly, 17. Dow Chemical and British Petroleum (BP) Amoco were competing against Univation Technologies, a joint venture of ExxonMobil and Union Carbide. Dow and Exxon held the basic catalyst patents, and BP and Union Carbide supplied process technology for polyethylene. As a condition of the acquisition, Dow made its catalyst technology available to BP-Amoco.
18. The beginning of this section draws upon Arora (2002) . government supported research, and university discoveries, have been less important. However, although they feature centrally, established fi rms have not been the only actors in chemical innovations. Rather, they share the stage with a variety of other fi rms, including start-ups. If nylon and polyethylene were discovered in corporate labs (of DuPont and ICI, respectively), polyester, the most successful synthetic material used in everything from clothes to plastic bottles, was discovered by chemists working for the Calico Printers Association, a group mostly concerned with textile printing. The fundamental advances in catalysts for producing polyethylene and polypropylene came from the work of Karl Ziegler, a German chemist funded by the local coal industry association, and from a small oil company in Oklahoma, Phillips. If the fi rst major refi ning technology, thermal cracking, originated from Standard Oil, the next one, catalytic cracking, was invented in 1936 by Eugene Houdry, a French engineer who moved to the United States to commercialize his invention. The technology was signifi cantly improved by a group of fi rms led by Standard Oil of New Jersey. The implication is that innovation in the chemical industry has drawn upon a diverse range of sources, including corporate R&D labs and government programs, but also a variety of small fi rms and start-ups.
Large government initiatives have had mixed success. They have been successful in coordinating private decisions when innovation required complementary improvements in inputs and uses, as well as large investments in complementary infrastructure. They have been successful in coaxing incremental technical advances, which have cumulatively contributed signifi cantly to productivity growth. The record of such initiatives in producing significant new technical advances in the chemical industry is poor, in part because these initiatives have had confl icting goals, such as increasing the efficiency of existing technology along with the development of new technologies.
The history of the chemical industry shows that technology has diffused effectively through markets for technology, without need for direct government subsidies. Markets for technology have also offered a prominent role for start-ups and other types of technology specialists, such as SEFs, which have been the engine of diffusion for chemical innovation as well as a frequent contributor. The chemical industry's history shows that indirect government policies that promote competition in the product market as well as in the market for technology can promote technical advance and productivity growth.
Competition in the technology market does not imply weakening intellectual property protection; rather, strong patent protection can facilitate competition by encouraging innovation by fi rms outside the industry, including start-ups. However, broad patent protection is effective when the underlying knowledge base is strong. For new bodies of knowledge, narrowly crafted patent protection works better at encouraging innovation and prevent-ing logjams. In addition, from time to time, antitrust policy has prevented chemical technology ownership from being concentrated in a few hands, enhancing competition among technology holders.
History rarely repeats itself, and its lessons cannot be applied mechanically. However, it appears that as was the case of chemical innovation, energy innovation is more likely to be successful and effective when private R&D from diverse sources is stimulated and strong patents protection is combined with robust antitrust enforcement.
